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ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate the empirical relationship between four measures of central bank
independence and macroeconomic performance. ~Ve look at both the mean and the variance ol'
ouiput and inflation for twenty industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, thc United Kingdom and the United States)
for the period 1972-1992. The elasticity of intlation with respect to central bank independence
is estimated and we calculate the fraction of the covariance between the mean and the variance
of inflation that can be explained by their common association with central bank independence.
We check the robustness of our results by looking at four indices of central bank
independence, two subperiods and by including control variables.
We find that centra] bank independence lowers the mean and variance of inflation but has no
effect on the mean and variance of output growth.I
1 INTRODUCTION'
In huth ccontimic rescarch ,ui~ policy making, the issue of centrul hank independence has been
wi~cly invesligated antl discussed during the I~tit decade. Tu a large extent, this intcrest is
mutivated by the success tif the Dcutsche Bundatibank in keepíng the rate of intlation stable at
a low Icvcl for sevcral decadeS. Economic theory as devcloped by Rogoff (1985), Neumann
(1991) and Lohm.uin ( I)92) suggests thaL countries having an independent central b~nk can
uchievc low inl]~Uiun rutcS bccause politicians cannot so easily inlluence monetary policy. This
is guod becuuse ~oliticiuns face a time-inconsistency problem whcn they try to implcment their
preferred policicS and thiS lcads lo inlerior outcomes. The time-incunsistency problem cun be
mitigutcd by delcgating monctury policy to an indcpcndenl central bank lhat is morc
ainscrvative than the govcmment in the sense that it careS more xbuut inllation. However, the
impmved credihilitv thut causes the lower rate o1 inl]ution coma5 at the eost of having ]ess
fle~ihiliry. Since the cunservative centrxl bank cares more about a low and stable rate of
inl7atiun, it will carc ]css ahout stahilizing output Shocks. [n this paper wc want to confront
lhcse thcorctical results with thc data for twenty industrial countries (Australiu, Austria,
Bclgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, [taly, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zcalunti, Swcden, Switrerland, the U.K. and the U.S.) for the post-Bretton Woods period
(1972-19~)2). We also want to investiga[e how Sensitive the empiric`il results are for the
mcasure uf ccntral bank independence and the sample period that is chosen. Therefore, we do
uur regressions with four dil~ferent measureS for central bank indcpendence and for both the
wholc sample pcriod antl two subpcriods 1972-1982 and 1983-1992.
Therc arc four important condusiuns that follow from our paper. First, our esumauon results
shuw an invcrsc rclationship betwcen ccntral hank independence and the level of inY7ation that
iS alSO found by Alesina (19RR, 1989) and Cukicrman, Webh and Neyapti (1992). lncluding
opcnness as an additional explanatory variable as suggested by Romer ('I993) doesn't change
our results. Secondly, likc Alcsina and Summers (1993), wc lind sume cmpirical evidcnce that
the more independent the central bank is, the lower the variance of int]ation. Thirdly, we do
not lind cmpirical support tar lhc implication of the Rogolf (IyRS) modcl that morc ccntral
hank indcpcn~lence lends tu a highcr variance of re~tl autput growUi. Fin~illy, after contrulling
Rir other fucwrs that inlluence ecunomic growth aS described by Barro (Ir))1), De Lon~ und
Summcrs (1992) and Lcvinc antl Renclt (1992), we tind no empirica rclationship betwecn
central bank indepcndence and the levcl ol real output growth.
Thc plan of this papcr iS ns lolluws. In scction 2, building on the Rogotf (1985) modcl wc
briclly analyzc lhe thcorelical relationships uf central bank independence with lhe dis[ributions
ol out~ut antl inllntian. In section 3 we cunfront thc propositionS From the game-theoreUc
modcl with empirical evidenu~. We perlorm u sensitivity anulysis that consists of using various
indices ul central bank independence, looking at two subperiods and adding control variables.
Finally, Scctíon 4 concludes.
' The authi~rs are gratctiil lor helplul commnnts hy Albeno Alesina, Lury Summers, Stanley Físcher, Guy Detielle
unil two anun,ymuus rcl'crces. Of course, the usuxl disclaimcr xpplies.z
D CREDIBILITY VS FLEXIBILITY
2.1 Recapitulaaronof~the Monetary Policy Gnme
This section offers a short sketch ot the theoretical background for the empirical work. It Gnks
the Rogoff mode] to the empirical work on indices of central bank independence (henceforth
CBI).
There are two players, wage-setters and the central bank. Wage-setters unilaterally choose the
nominal wage every period, and the central bank controls mone[ary policy. The labour market
is characterized by one-period nominal wage contracts [Gray (1976), Fischer (1977a)].
Therefore, unemployment falls with unanticipated inflation. The behaviour of wage-setters is
captured by a standard Phillips curve.
(2.1) u~ - u- 1(~p~ -E~-~~P~ tv~`~) 0 ~(3 ~ 1 1-R
where u is unemployment, tï is the permanent or "natural" rate of unemployment, (1 -~3)' are
the employment gains of unanticipated inflation (the slope of the Phillips curve) and v,'' is an
aggregate supply shock with mean zero and finite variance a~,~.
The socia] loss function W penalizes both inflation and unemployment
(2.2) W, - 2(Op~)~ t 2(u,)~ p ~ x ~ o,
The parameter X is the relative weight of unemployment stabilizauon relative to inflation
stabilization in the prefercnces of society. It is well-known that the minimization of (2.2)
suhject to the PMllips curve (2.1) results in a counterproductive inflation bias [Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983)J with no gains in the form of systematic lower
unemployment.
2.2 Th~e Legi~~lative Approach
In this paper we consider the legislative approach to monetary stability, namely to create by
law a very independent central bank with an unequivocal mandate to focus on price stability.
Academic contributions in this area are Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992).
Rogoff proofs that society (the principal) can reduce the time-consistent inflation rate, at
the expense of a less flexible response to output shocks, by delegating monetary policy to an
agent who is known to place a greater weight on intlation stabilization than is embodied in the
social loss function (2.I).
This agent minimizes
(23) L~ - 1~ c(~P~)~ t 2(u,)~ 0 ~ e ~~
When e is strictly greater than zero, then this agent is more "conservative" than society.
In the empitical part of this paper several measures (indices) of central bank independence are
used. According to these indices, central banks in which the only or main objective of
monetary policy (as specitïed in the central bank law) is price stability are classified as being
more independent than central bank ]aws with a number of o[)jectives in addition to price
stability, or central banks in whose law price stability is not mentioned as an objective at all.
Therefore, following most of the literature we proxy CBI as the strength of the3
"conservative biau" of the central bank as embodied in the law'.
2.3 lmplications of the Credibiliry vs. Fle-zibi[iry Model
The algorithm for deriving the time-consistent equilibrium under central bank independence
(equation (2.3)) is standard. Thc resulting output and inflaCion rates are given by3
(2.4) u -u - -(1-(3)(1~E) v"
` (1-(3)~(lte)tX
`
~2-5) Opr- x u- p X v"r
(1-p)(~tE) (1-F')~(lte)tx
Following Cukierman (1992, pp. 353-355) in this section we investigate the effects of CBI on
the implied distributions of output and inflation. As is suggested by the main intuition of the
Rogoff model, there is an inverse relation between CBI and the mean inflation rate and a
positive relation hetween CBI and the variance of output. The reason is simple, increasing the
central batilc's eommitment to fighting inflation reduces society's credibility problem (and hence
the mean and variance of inflation) at the expense of a distorted response to ouput shocks, -
i.e. flexibilitv - increasing the variance of ouput. Finally, the mean output level is unaffected by
CBI, as is to be expected in a natural rate model".
We now move on to confront the implications of the credibility vs. flexibility model with some
empirical evidence.
III EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
This section takes a hard look into the empirical evidence regarding the link between central
bank independence and the level and variability of inf7ation and economic growth, respectively.
Unfortunately, most existing research has focused on one measure of central bank
independence only, so that it is not clear whether conclusions drawn are 'measure specifïc'. To
overcome this difficulty, we use the measures of Alesina (198R, 1989), Grilli, Masciaodaro and
Tabellini (1991), Eijffinger and Schaling (1992, 1993a) and Cukierman ~ 1992) as explanatory
variables. We compare the outcomes of our eropirical analysis on thc relationship between
central bank independence and the ]cvel and variability of inflation and economic growth with
results reported in the literature.
3.1 The levcl of inflntion
According to Alesina (1988, 1989), eountries with an independent central bank will have lower
rates of inl7ation than do countries with a dependent central bank. This well-known inverse
' Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1996) explicitly distinguish hetween conservativeness and independence.
71ie supply funMion that is consistent with (2.1) is given by
y, - y t 1 R R cOp, - E, -, Op, t v,")
Foanally this can be shown by taldng the first derivative of both moments of ou[put and intlation with respect to
E.4
relationship between central bank independence and the level of inflation is also supported by
empirica] studies of De Haan and Sturm (1992), Alesina and Summers (I993) and Eíjffinger
and Schaling (19936). It should, however, be noted that a negative correlation between central
bank independence and inflation does not necessarily imply causation. The correlation betwcen
both variables could be explained by a third factor, e.g. the culture and tradition of monetary
stability in a country, explaining both an independent central bank and low inflation.s
Still, the degree of central bank independence may be an important factor in explaining the
level of inflation, because central bank independence reflects the ability and willingness to
conduct an autonomous monetary policy directed at price stability. If not seriously hampered
by wage increases, budget deficits and government debt, such policy will eventually lead to a
low and sustainable levta of inf7ation. The ulàmate determinants of central bank independence
are discussed more extensively in Eijffinger and De Haan (1995).
Using OLS regressions we invescigate the link between the average level of inflarion
(annual percentage change of the Consumer Price Index) and the degree nf central bank
indepcndence according to the measures of Alesina (AL), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini
(GMT), Eijffinger and Schaling (ES) and Cukierman (LVAU). The countries considered are
Aus[ralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States. The relationship between average inflation in these
countries and the four indices of central bank independence is analyzed for the post-Bretton-
Woods period 1972-1992. Under the Bretton-Woods system offixe~d exchange rates, countries
were committed to an exchange rate target and had little room to conduct an autonomous
domestic monetary policy. Thus, the relationship between central barilc independence and
inflation is likely to be much less straightrorward before 1972. Regression analysis by De Haan
and Sturm (1992) supports this view. These authors found no significant relationship between
both variables for the period 1961-1969.
In our analysis the post-Bretton-Woods period is divided into two subperiods (1972-1982
and 1983-1992) in order to distinguish between EMS countries (Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and, partly, Austria, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom) on the one hand and non-EMS countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States) on the othec Although the
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS (ERM) was enacted in March 1979 after the 'snake
arrangement', Ungerer (1990) characterizes the firs[ phase of the EMS (1979-1982) as a period
of 'initial orientauon' full of frequent and, sometimes, large realignments of central rates. From
I982 onwards, the EMS enters a second phase of'consolidation' (1982-1987), and - after the
accord of Basle-Nyborg - moves into a third phase of 're-examination' (1987-presen[).6
Consequently, the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation is
expected to be less clear cut during the second subperiod (1983-1992) than during the first
subperiod (1972-1982), because of the priority EMS countries gave at that time to exchange
rate stability. After 1982 monetary policy in these countries - except Germany as the anchor
country - has become increasingly endogenous because exchange rate targets became
' The standard example is the case of Germany, where the hyperinflation in the 1920s led to a cul[ure and tradi[ion
of monetary stability.
e According to Ungerer ( I990) the phase of consolidation was marked hy "...a widespread consensus to follow
aWbílily-oriented policie,i, an increasiug convergence in the development of custs, prices and monetary
aggregates, and by long periods without realignments ofcentral rates." (p. 33R).5
dominant-
Table 3.1 Averal;e intlation and the measures of CBI
Explanatory vaziables 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
Constant 12.40 14.10 16.05 18.40 8.38 9.33
(12.74) (12.51) (12.58) (12.27) (9.51) (8.61)
Alesina (AL) -2.24 -2.27 -2.78 -2.82 -1.65 -1.66
(-5.33)" (-6.14)" (-5.04)" (-5.84)~ (-4.34)" (-4.50)"
Openness -5.75 -8.p1 -3.23
(-2.23)' (-2.35)' (-1.43)
R~ (adjusted) 0.63 0.72 0.60 0.70 0.52 0.56
Constatu 15.27 15.85 19.46 20.03 7.85 8.89
(9.53) (7.46) (11.05) (8.42) (7.41) (6.79)
Grilli et aL (GMT) -0.92 -0.93 -1.11 -1.12 -0.42 -0.43
(-4.81)" (-4.69)" (-5.30)" (-5.16)" (-3.28)` (-3.43)~
Openness -1.74 -1.77 -3.01
(-0.43) (-0.38) (-1.30)
RZ (adjusted) 0.58 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.38 0.41
Constant 12.27 11.88 ]5.53 15.35 7.56 7.67
(7.47) (5.75) (8.43) (6.53) (8.60) (7.12)
Eijtfinger-Schaling (ES) -1.60 -1.65 -1.90 -1.93 -1.03 -1.01
(-2.85)' (-2.75)' (-3.03)" (-2.84)' (-3.42)" (-3.14)"
Openness 1.78 0.84 -0.53
(0.32) (0.13) (-O.Ic~~
R' (adjusted) 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.34
Const(uu 10.74 11.49 14.28 14.95 6.84 7.61
(9.06) (7.19) (8.43) (6.84) (7.14) (6.16)
Cukierman (LVAU) -R.83 -8.78 -11.50 -11.50 -5.89 -5.79
(-2.92)" (-2.86)~ (-2.87)' (-2.8O)' (-2.41)' (2.36)'
Opcnness -2.52 -2.25 -2.~8
(-0.72) (-0.46) (-0.99)
R~ (adjusted) 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.21
Notes: t-values are in pazenlheses. One asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at a
95oI contidence level, two asterisks indicaze that theccefficient is significant at a 997c confidence level.
Table 3.1 shows our estimation results for average inflation and the four measures of
central bank independence during the whole period (1972-1992) and both subperiods (1972-
1982 and 1983-1992). Following Romer (1993) we have also included the variable 'bpenness"
as measured hy the percentagc share of imports in GDP in thc regression equation as an
explanatory variable for the level of inflation. During the post-Bretton-Woods period and both
subperiods, the inverse relationship between inflation and central bank independence appears to
be significant for all measures. It should also be noted that including the variable openness
doesn't change the results much, indicating that the estimated coefficients are robust.
The conclusion that follows from table 3.1 is that the more independent a central bank is,6
the lower the rate of intlation in the long run will be. The table also confirms our intuition that
the ini7ation reducing effect of a one unit increase in an index of CBI is larger in the first
subperiod than in the second. This holds for all four indices of CBI.
Cukierman has elaborated his lega] independence index (LVAU) for 68 countries - i.e. 21
developed industrial countries and 47 developing countries. Cukierman found no signifïcant
link between central bank independence and inflation for the group of developing countries. In
his opinion, this is a consequence of the fact that these countries have "less regard for the
law."'
Table 3.2 Elasticity of intlation with respect to the measur
Explanatory 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
variables
Constant 2.44 2.70 2.04
(25.58) (28.34) (12.80)
Alesina (AL) -0.68 -0.63 -0.82
(-5.67)" (-5.29)" (-4.08)"
R~ (adjusted) 0.66 0.63 0.49
Constant 3.54 3.73 2.66
(11.83) (13.11) (6.02)
Grilli et al. (GMT) -0.78 -0.73 -0.62
(-5.26)'" (-5.15)" (-2.85)'
R~ (adjusted) 0.62 0.61 0.31
Constant 2.42 2.66 1.98
(15.35) (18.77) (11.02)
Eijl'finger-Schaling (ES) -0.48 -0.44 -0.57
(-3.06)" (-2.99)'" (-3.17)"
R~ (adjusted) 0.32 0.31 0.34
Constant 1.54 1.84 1.07
(8.11) (9.95) (4.00)
Cukierman (LVAU) -0.38 -0.3R -0.35
(-2.42)' (-2.51)' (-1.58)
R'- (adjusted) 0.21 0.23 0.p8
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates [hat the coef[icient is significantly different from zero at a
95~I confidence level, two asterisk.c indicate that the coefficient is significant at a 99~k confidence level.
Because the four indices of CBI that we used in our analysis all are defined on a different
scale, the size of the parameters is difficult to interpret. Therefore, we also calculated the
elasticities of inílation with respect to the different measures of CBI. We did this by estimating
a regression equation in which the log of inflation is explained by the log of CBI and a
constant. The results are presented in [able 3.2.
' 7his is only valid for the legal measure of Cukierman for central bank independence. If the'turnover raté of
centra] bank governors ís used as a measure of actual independence, Cukíerman (1992) finds a sienificant
negative relationship for developing countries.7
From table 3.2 we conclude that for the whole sample period and for the first subperiod a one
percent increase in CBI as measured by the GMT index yields the highest reduction in the rate
of inflation. For the second subperiod, the elasticity of inflation with respect to the Alesina
index is the highest. Interestingly, a comparison between the first and the second subperiod
doesn't give a clearcut result in table 3.2, as it did in table 3.1.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Debelle and Fischer (1995) have shown that if the GMT
measure is split into various components (lack of goal independence, political independence
and economic independence) the two variables that most closely tied to inflation performance
are lack of goal independence (i.e. the bank has a statutory requiremem to pursue price
stability) and economic independence (i.e. ins[rument independence); the variables relating to
appointment procedures are not significantly related to ini7ation.
3.2 The variabiliryof inflation
What is the empirical relationship between central bank independence and the variability of
inflation? Chowdhury (1991) has investigated the relation between the level and variabili[y of
inflation in 66 countries for the period from 1955 to 1985. He concludes that during this period
there exists a significant, positive correlation between both variables. De Haan and Sturm
(1992) have also examined this relation in eighteen industrial countries for thc period 1961-
1987. They found a clear, positive correlauon between both variables for the post-Bretton-
Woods subperiods 1970-197R and 1979-1987, but no fbr the subperiod 1961-1969.
We expect that greater independence should lead to less variability of inflation- We assume
the various measures of central bank independence (AL, GMT, ES and LVAU) to be the
explanatory variables of the variance of inflation (CPI) for the sample. Agaín, the relationship
between the four indices and the variance of inl7ation is examined for the complete post-
Bretton-Woods period (1972-1992) and our two subperiods (1972-1982 and 1983-1992).
During the second subperiod, the negative cotrelation between central bank independence and
inflation variability is also expected to be less clear cut than during the first subperiod as a
conseyuence of growing exchange rate stability between EMS countries.
Table 3.3 shows the results for the variance of inflation and the four measures of central
bank independence using data from the sample. The inverse relationship between inflation
variability and independence is signitïcant for the index of Grilli et aL (all periods), for the
Cukierman index (whole period and first subperiod) and for the Alesina index (second
subperiod). For the other indices and periods, we find a negative but insignificant relation for
both the whole period, and its two subperiods. From this table, it may be concluded that there
is some evidence that greater independence of a central bank guarantees a more stable
inflation.A Hence therc is some empirical evidence that the more independent the central bank,
the lower the variance of the inflation rate.
a De Haan and Sturm (1992) find a significant negative rela[ionship for themodified measure ofGrilli et al. and
for the Alesina and ES indices during the period 1961-1987. Alesina and Summers (1993) report similaz results
for an average ofthe Alesina and GMT index.H
Table 3.3 Variance of intlation and the measures of
Explanatory 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
v:uiables
Constant 25.34 11.85 12.02
(4.61) (2.23) (4.06)
Alesina (AL) -4.61 -0.72 -3.31
(-2.02) (-0.31) (-2.59).
RZ(adjusted) 0.16 -0.06 0.26
Constant 45.51 30.93 25.25
(8.15) (5.77) (4.28)
Grilli et aL (GMT) -3.40 -2.35 -2.31
(-SA9)" (-3.41)" (-3.27)'"
RZ (adjusted) 0.61 Q40 p,3g
Constant 26.38 17.70 11.59
(4.13) ~ (2.99) (1.93)
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) -3.63 -2.31 -1.79
(-1.66) (-1.15) (-0.87)
R'- (adjusted) 0.09 0.02 -0.01
Constant 27.04 18.60 8.60
(5.09) (4.59) (3.08)
Cukierman (I,VAU) -3Q41 -23.10 -10.60
(-2.24)` (-2.24)" (-1.49)
R~(adjusted) 0.18 U.IS O.p6
Notes t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at a
95~1o confidence level, two asterisks indicate that thecoefficient is significant at a 999o confidence level.
We have also calculated, for each measure of CBI, how much of the strong positive
association between the mean and the variance of inflation is due to their common association
with CBI. "I'his analysis is performed along the lines of Cukierman (1992) and Cukietman and
Webb (1995). We predicted lhe mean and the variance of inflation, using only CBI as an
explanatory variable. The ratio between the covariance of the predictions and the covariance of
the actual mean and variance of infladon are a measure for the extent to which the positive
association between variance and mean can be attributed to CBI. We find the following ratios
as presented in table 3.4.9 Cukierman (1992) reports a value of 0.19 for developed countries
for the period 1950-1989. This comes close to our value of Q.21 for the LVAU index for our
sample period. The most striking result that we find in table 3.4 is that between 86 and 100qo
of the positive covariance between the mean and the variance of inflation can be explained by
cross country variations of the GMT index.
~ 71te fact that for the GMT index the ratio is larger than one must be due to negative correlation between the
residuals of the two regressions.9
Tabel 3.4 CBI and the association between mean and variance of inflati
Index 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-1992
AL 0.24 0.06 Q50
GMT 0.86 0.89 1.02
ES 0.25 0.23 0.30
LVAU 0.21 0.26 0.19
Note: The figures in thz table represent the fraction of the covariance between the mean and the varianee ol'
inflation thal is due lo their common associa[ion with Ihe index ofCBI fnr the differen[ periods.
3.3 Economic grnwth
Central bank independence may stimulate economic growth in the longer run because with a
low and stable rate of int7ation the functioning of the price mechanism will be better. Empirical
research by Grimes (1991) and Fischer (1993) shows that inflation reduces economic growth."'
This may be explained by the positive corelation between the level and variability of inflauon.
Greater variation in thc rate of inflation can imply increasing uncertainty about inflation :uid
may, thereby, leud to lower economic growth. This relationship between infladon variability
and economic growth is, however, not supported by most studies.
Various studies have examined directly whether central bank independence affects
cconomic growth. Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), De Haan and Sturm (1992),
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b) and Alesina and Summers (1993) all conclude that central bank
independence has no effect on economic growth.
This conclusion is supported by results reported in table 3.5 which presents estimates for
the average annual growth rate of per capita real Gross Domestic Product, and the four
measures of central bank independence. The literature on long-run economic growth identifies
various factors that determine the growth rate of a country. Based on Barro (1991), De Long
and Summers (1992) and Levine and Renelt (1992) we have chosen two additional variables to
be included in the regression: Initial GDP per capita (Y60) and the share of investment in GDP
(UI'). The relationship between real economic growth and central bank independence appears
to be insignificant except for the GMT index during the second subperiod (1983-1992) where
central bank independence has à positive effect on gruwth. The coefficients for the other
indices and periods have mixed signs and are insignificant. Despite the fact that a high degree
of central bank independence is associated with lower int7ation in the long run, it follows from
tablc 3.5 that a policy of disinflation is apparently not associated with high costs or great
benefits in terms of long-run economic growth. Hence, in general, empirical evidence shows
that there is no relationship between central bank independence and average real output
growth."
We xlso note that a one unit increase in an index for CBI leads to more expected output
This conclusion of Grimes (1991) and Fischer (1993) is contradicted in a study by Karras (1993).
Cukierman (1993, p. 284) reports that when similar experiments are repeated forLDCs, again, no association is
found betwecn legal independence and growth. Using several behavioral meastues of cenval bank independence,
like [hc turnover rate of cenval bank governors, and controlling for otherdeterminants ofgrowth Cukierman,
Kalaitzidakis, Summers and Webb (1993) find a ceteris paribus positive association between growth and central
bankindependence.1(1
gruwth in the second subpenod than in the first onc.
Table 3.5 Average economic growth and the measures ot' C[3
Explanatory 1972-1I92 1972-1982 1983-1992
v:uiables
Constant 3.50 1.73 4.44
(3.64) (1.26) (3.80)
Alesina (AL) 0.20 0.04 0.38
(1.52) (0.20) (2.03)
UY -0.OU Q06 -0.05
(-0.00) (1.65) (-].24)
Y60 -0.31 -U.25 -0.33
(-4.62)'. (-2.49)' (-3.81)"
R~(adjusted) 0.62 0.52 0.43
Constant 3.89 3.I9 4.40
(5.85) (2.78) (6.18)
Grilli ct xL (CMT) 0.07 U.04 p.l l
(2.06) (0.75) (2.24)~
UY -0.01 0.01 -0.03
(-0.34) (0.34) (-0.95)
Y60 -0.37 -0.32 -0.41
(-7.42)" (-3.99)" (-6.27)'~
RZ (ad,justed) 0.81 Q62 0.72
Constant 3.61 1.81 4.70
(4.49) (1.69) (4.67)
Eijl7inger-Sch~iling (ES) -0.03 -0.I 1 0.04
(-0.33) (-0.97) (0.32)
UY 0.01 0.07 -0.03
(0.42) (2.19)" (-0.95)
Y60 -0.29 -0.23 -0.32
(-5.41)"' (-3.14)" (-4.13)"
R'- (adjusted) 0.66 0.59 0.46
Constant 3.45 1.95 4.26
(3.82) (1.58) (3.95)
Cukierman (LVAU) 0.26 -0.47 1.17
(0.36) (-0.51) (1.17)
UY QOl 0.06 -Q02
(0.47) (1.85) (-0.70)
Y60 -0.30 -0.24 -0.33
(-4.65).. (-2.70)~ (-3.86)'.
R~ (a~justed) 0.62 0.57 0.41
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. One asterisk indicates that the ccefficient is signifícandy different from zero at a
95N conlidence level, two asterisks indicatelhat Iheecefficient is si~nitïcan[ at a 999o confidence level.1l
3.4 The Variabilih' o(Oufpur Growth
A new question is whether there exists a relationship between central hxnk independence and
the variation of econornic growth. Theory predicts different outcomes. According to Rogofl
(1985), independent central banks purchase a lower level of inflation at the price of a highet
variability of real economic growth. In contrast, Alesina and Summers (1993) urgue that an
autonomous central bank will he less inclined to conduct a'stop-go' policy which may limit
fluctuations in economic growth. Alesina and Gatti (1995) formalize this point.
Table 3.fi Variance of economic t;rowth and the measures of CBI
Explanatory 1972-1992 1972-1982 1983-L992
variah]es
Constant 7.95 7.96 7.33
(3.59) (4.06) (2.25)
Alesina (AL) -0.65 -0.14 -1. ] 1
(-0.68) (-0.17) (-0.79)
R~ (adjustcd) -0.03 -0.06 -0.03
Constant 11.63 12.31 10.4R
(4.36) (5.12) (2.93;)
Grilli et aL (GMT) -0.60 -0.50 -0.69
(-1.88) (-1.74) (-L63)
R~(adjusted) 0.14 0.11 0.09
Constant 9.06 8.40 9.311
(3.32) (3.73) (2.55)
Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) -0.71 -0.10 -L34
(-0.77) (-O.14) (-1.08)
R~ (adjusted) -OA2 -0.06 0.01
Constant 6.97 6.64 6.75
(3.69) (4.01) (2.39)
Cukíerman (LVAU) -1.51 2.1 1 -4.R4
(-0.31) (0.5U) (-0.67)
R~ (adjusted) -0.OS -0.04 -0.03
Notes: t-values are in pazentheses. One asterisk indicates that the cceffïcienl is significxndy different from zero at a
95~ confidence Ievel, two asterisks indicate that the ccn;fficient is significant at a 99~ confidence level.
Table 3.6 shows results of our regression analysis where the four measures of central bank
independencc try to explain the variance of annual economic growth rates. For none of the four
measures, ttte coefficient appears to be significantly diffèrent from zero. On top of that, we ulso
find most cocftïcient.e to be negative, indicating that more central bank independence is
xssociated with lower variance of output growth. Consequently, we may conclude that a higher
degrec of central bank independence is not associated with greater variation of real economic
growth rates. Alesina and Gatti (1995) provide a possible theoretical explanation for this
empirical finding. Thcy suggest that variance of output growth consists of two components.
Apart from productivity shocks that arc also present in Rogoff (19R5), Alesina and Gatti
(1995) have politic~lly induced output shocks in their model. They show that the effect of12
thcse shocks can be reduced by making the central bank more independent. So there are two
opposite ef1'ec[s, which may explain these empirical findings. Comparing the two subperiods
shows us thut an increase in CBI leads to a larger expected reduction of the variance of output
growth in the second subperiod than in the first one.
IV CONCLUSION
The main conclusions of this theoretical and empirical analysis of central bank independence
with respect to the level and variability of infla[ion and economic growth are the following.
First of all, both our model and estimation resul[s, give further support to the wel]-known
inverse relatiunship hetween the degree of central bank independence and the levcl of inflation
found by Alesina (19RR, 1989) and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). Secondly,
we find some empirical evidence - especially for the Cukierman and GMT indices - supporting
our proposition that the more independent the central bank is, thc lower the variabdity of
int7ation.
Thirdly, according to our proposition that the level of economic growth does not depend
on the prevailing monetary regime, no relationship can be found between central bank
independence and the level of real output growth in the long run. Our interpretation of this
outcome is that the attainment and maintenance of low inflation by an independent central bank
is not accompanied by ]arge costs or benefits in terms of sustainable economic growth.
Fourthly and finally, our esumation results reject clearly the proposition of a positive relation
between independence and the variability of real output growth. An independent central bank
does not lead to more variable economic growth in [he short run. In other words, inf7ation-
averse central hanks do not bear the costs of triggering recessions nor do politically sensitíve
central banks reap the benetïts of avoiding recessions. The absence of a long-run trade off
between CBI and the mean and variance of economic growth implies that the establishment of
central bank independence in countries, which did not use to have this, is a free lunch" (Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991).
Whcn looking at the differences between the subperiods that wc distinguish, there are three
observations with respect to the point estimates of CBI that can he made for all four indices.
First, the intlation reducing effect of a one unit increase of CB1, according to all indices, was
larger in the Rrs[ subperiod than in thc second. Interestingly, this doesn't hold in terms of
elasticities. Secondly, after controlling for initial GDP and the share of investment, a one unit
increase of CBI leads to more output growth in the second subperiod than in the first. Thirdly,
a one unit increvse of CB[ ]eads to a larger reductiun of the variance of output growth in the
second subperiod than in the first.13
THE DATA
The mean and variance of infla[ion have been calculated from Consumer Prices- All
Items, Non-adjusted, OECD Main Economic Indicators;
The mean and variance of per capita ou[put growth, intial (1960) per capita real GDP and
the share of investment over GDP are calculated from Penn World Tables;
Openness as measured by the share of imports in GDP is calculated from the National
Account,c of OECD Countries, 1960-1977, 1977-1989, 1978-1992. (Imports of goods and
serviceslGDP), in current prices. OECD Paris, 1979, 1991, 1994.
The indices for CBI can be found in Eijftïnger and De Haan (1996). Some observations are
not available for the sample of 20 countries. For AL, Austria, Ireland and Portugal are not
available, for GMT, Finland, Norway and Sweden, for ES, Ireland and for LVAU Portugal
are lacking.
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